

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

DESERT VALLEY PAINTING & DRYWALL,  
INC.,  
  
Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendant,  
  
vs.  
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
  
Defendants & Counterclaim Plaintiff.

Case No. 2:10-cv-00490-KJD-GWF  
**ORDER**

**Motion for Protective Order - #34**

DENKO DRYWALL COMPANY,  
  
Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendant,  
  
vs.  
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
  
Defendants & Counterclaim Plaintiff.

Case No. 2:10-cv-00498-LRH-GWF  
**ORDER**

**Motion for Protective Order - #32**

This matter is before the Court in Case No. 2:10-cv-490-KJD-GWF on Defendant/Counterclaimant United States' Motion for Protective Order (#34), filed on September 22, 2011; Plaintiff Desert Valley Painting & Drywall, Inc.'s Response to the Motion for Protective Order (#35), filed on October 6, 2011; and the United States' Reply in Support of its Motion for Protective Order (#37), filed on October 17, 2011. This matter is also before the Court in Case No. 2:10-cv-498-LRH-GWF on Defendant/Counterclaimant United States' Motion for Protective Order (#32), filed on September 22, 2011; Plaintiff Denko Drywall Company's Response to the Motion for Protective Order (#33), filed on October 6, 2011; and the United States' Reply in Support of its Motion for Protective Order (#35), filed on October 17, 2011. The Court conducted a combined hearing on these motions on October 24, 2011.

**BACKGROUND**

For purposes of the instant motions, the facts in both cases are substantially identical. Plaintiffs Desert Valley Painting & Drywall, Inc. (“Desert Valley”) and Denko Drywall Company (“Denko”) are Nevada licensed drywall contractors. *Complaints (#1)*, ¶ 5. Plaintiffs allege that they entered into contracts with Centennial Drywall Systems, Inc. (“Centennial” or “CDSI”) to provide drywall workers for construction projects in Nevada. The workers provided by CDSI were allegedly retained by it as independent contractors. Desert Valley and Denko paid funds directly to CDSI for the workers’ services. Desert Valley and Denko did not make any payments to the individual workers. ¶¶ 6-7. Desert Valley and Denko allege that “CDSI treated its workers as independent contractors pursuant to a worker classification letter from the Internal Revenue Service (‘Worker Classification Letter’) that had been issued over a decade ago and served as the industry-wide standard for drywall contractors.” ¶ 8. Plaintiffs allege that the tax deposits made and payroll amounts reflected on their Form 941 returns did not include amounts paid under the contracts with CDSI because the workers provided pursuant to the contracts were treated by CDSI as independent contractors pursuant to the IRS’s Worker Classification Letter. ¶ 9.

Plaintiffs allege that beginning in or about July 2007 the IRS began efforts to reclassify the drywall workers as employees rather than independent contractors. The IRS first attempted to collect employment taxes from CDSI. After that effort was unsuccessful, the IRS allegedly pursued efforts to collect employee taxes from Desert Valley, Denko and other drywall contractors who used CDSI’s services. ¶¶ 11-14. On or about June 8, 2009, the IRS sent Plaintiffs “Statements of Adjustment to Account” for the additional taxes and interest allegedly owed for the CDSI drywall workers that the IRS had now reclassified as employees of the Plaintiffs. Desert Valley and Denko made partial payments on the disputed taxes and filed requests for abatement and refunds. After waiting the required six months without a response from the IRS, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuits for refunds of the partial payments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346(a) and 26 U.S.C. §7422. ¶¶ 15-18. The United States has filed counterclaims in both actions to recover the full amount of the taxes and interest allegedly owed by Desert Valley and Denko.

...

1 Plaintiffs listed five IRS employee witnesses in their respective Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures  
 2 who are “expected to testify regarding the worker classification determination and proposed  
 3 changes to employment tax as to [Plaintiff].” *Motions for Protective Order* (#34, #32), pp. 3-4.<sup>1</sup>  
 4 The witnesses are identified by their IRS title or position, but not by name. Plaintiffs also list “[a]  
 5 witness described as an Internal Revenue Service Employment Tax Specialist” who will “testify  
 6 regarding the Centennial Audits and the basis for the workers classification determinations arising  
 7 therefrom,” and “[a] witness described as an Internal Revenue Service Revenue Officer” who will  
 8 “testify regarding the taxes assessed pursuant to the worker classification determination and his  
 9 recommendations regarding those taxes.”

10 The Government contends that Plaintiffs intend to elicit testimony from these IRS  
 11 employees regarding the impressions and conclusions they formed and reached during the  
 12 administrative process, and/or the factual and legal analysis they employed in evaluating Plaintiffs’  
 13 potential liability for the taxes at issue in these actions. *Motion for Protective Order* (#34), pp. 2-4.  
 14 The Government contends that such testimony is irrelevant and that Plaintiffs should be precluded  
 15 from deposing the IRS employees or calling them as witnesses at trial regarding such matters.

16 Plaintiffs also served the following requests for production of documents on the  
 17 Government:

18 **Request No. 11:** Produce all documents prepared by you which refer,  
 19 reflect or relate to the audit of [Centennial’s] 1988 and 1989  
 20 employment tax returns and/or on which you relied in reaching the  
 worker classification determination resulting from that audit.

21 **Request No. 12:** Produce all documents prepared by you which refer,  
 22 reflect or relate to the audit of [Centennial’s] Form 1120 tax return  
 for tax year ending October 31, 1990, and/or on which you relied in  
 reaching the determination resulting from that audit.

23 **Request No. 13:** Produce all documents prepared by you which refer, reflect  
 24 or relate to the 1994 worker status determination regarding [Centennial’s]  
 worker [Mr. K], and/or on which you relied in reaching the resulting worker  
 25 classification determination.

---

26  
 27 <sup>1</sup> All combined references to docket numbers list the docket number in Case No. 2:10-cv-  
 28 490-KJD-GWF first, followed by the corresponding docket number in Case No. 2:10-cv-498-LRH-  
 GWF.

1           **Request No. 14:** Produce all documents prepared by you which refer, reflect  
2           or relate to the audit of [Centennial's] 2004 and 2005 employment tax  
3           returns and/or on which you relied in reaching any worker classification  
4           determination resulting from that audit.

5           The Government objected to these requests on the grounds that the requested information is  
6           irrelevant and that information relating to CDSI is protected from disclosure by 26 U.S.C. §6103.

7           The Government also objects to Plaintiffs' Request No. 16 which states as follows:

8           **Request No. 16:** Produce all documents which refer, reflect or relate to  
9           communications, whether written or oral, made by [Centennial's] or any of  
10          its directors, officers, employees, agents, attorneys, accountants, or anyone  
11          else holding him or herself out as an authorized representative of Centennial,  
12          that would support that workers provided under the Plaintiff's contract with  
13          Centennial were employees of Plaintiff, that Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was  
14          responsible for collecting, withholding, and paying over of payroll taxes for  
15          those workers, or that Plaintiff knew or should have known that the workers  
16          were employees of Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was responsible for collecting,  
17          withholding, and paying over of payroll taxes for those workers.

18          The Government responded to Request No. 16 by stating that it has disclosed witnesses and  
19          documents collected in connection with the audit of Plaintiffs' 2004, 2005 and/or 2006  
20          employment tax returns which it may use to support its claims or defenses pursuant to Rule 26 and  
21          the Court's instructions. The Government objected to this request on the grounds that the  
22          documents are protected from disclosure by 26 U.S.C. §6103.

23          The Government also objects to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 7 which states as follows:

24          **Interrogatory No. 7:** State the principal facts upon which you relied to deny  
25          the allegation contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's complaint that "the  
26          Internal Revenue Service attempted to collect payroll taxes from  
27          [Centennial] but was unsuccessful." To the extent that your denial was based  
28          on a lack of knowledge or information, identify the nature of the  
                documentation and/or information you need to be able to affirmatively admit  
                or deny those allegations, and what efforts have been made to obtain said  
                information and/or documentation.

                The Government responded to this interrogatory by stating that it did not deny the  
allegations contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' complaints, but rather stated that it lacked  
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of those allegations. The  
Government also objected to Interrogatory No. 7 on grounds that the information regarding  
Centennial is protected from disclosure by 26 U.S.C. § 6103.

...

## DISCUSSION

The Government seeks a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against being required to respond to discovery into the analysis, impressions or conclusions reached by IRS employees or officers during the administrative process regarding the Plaintiffs' potential liability for the employment taxes at issue. The Government argues that such information is irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case. In support of this assertion, the Government relies on *R.E. Dietz Corp. v. United States*, 939 F.2d 1, 4 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1991) and other cases regarding the standard which governs the district court's determination in a tax refund action. *Dietz* states in this regard:

Ordinarily, in an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) for a refund of taxes already paid to the government, the district court is required to redetermine the entire tax liability. *Lewis v. Reynolds*, 284 U.S. 281, 283, 52 S.Ct. 145, 146, 76 L.Ed. 293 (1932). The factual and legal analysis employed by the Commissioner is of no consequence to the district court. *National Right to Work Legal Def. & Educ. Found. v. United States*, 487 F.Supp. 801, 805 (E.D.N.C.1979); *see also Ruth v. United States*, 823 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir.1987) ("courts will not look behind an assessment to evaluate the procedure and evidence used in making the assessment."); *Kentucky Trust Co. v. Glenn*, 217 F.2d 462, 465-66 (6th Cir.1954). "[T]he court does not sit in judgment of the Commissioner; the court places itself in the shoes of the Commissioner." *National Right to Work*, 487 F.Supp. at 805. Thus, a *de novo* review of the determination and assessment should be conducted. *Ruth*, 823 F.2d at 1094.

Based on this *de novo* review standard, trial courts have prohibited or restricted discovery regarding the IRS's administrative determinations of the tax liability on the grounds that it is irrelevant, except in those cases in which the IRS Commissioner is vested with some discretion in the imposition of a tax. *See Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States*, 51 Fed.Cl. 1, 6 (2001); *McLeod v. United States*, 2000 WL 1902257 \*2 (D.Nev. 2000) and *Xcel Energy, Inc. v. United States*, 237 F.R.D. 416 (D.Minn. 2006).

In *Xcel Energy, Inc. v. United States*, the government disallowed certain corporate interest deductions on life insurance policies that the plaintiff had purchased on behalf of its employees. The plaintiff requested production of documents relating to the government's decision to disallow the deduction. The government produced most of the requested documents, but redacted those

1 portions of the documents that contained the analysis and opinions of the IRS personnel based on  
2 lack of relevancy and the deliberative process privilege. In holding that the redacted portions were  
3 irrelevant, the court relied on *Mayes v. United States*, 1986 WL 10093 (W.D.Mo. 1986) in which  
4 the plaintiff sought to discover an internal agency memorandum prepared by an IRS agent during  
5 the administrative appeal of the plaintiff's claim. After noting the *de novo* standard to be applied,  
6 the *Mayes* court stated:

7 . . . The court will not be reviewing the analysis followed by the IRS  
8 employee or the reasons why the IRS made the assessment. As the  
9 cases cited earlier indicate, it will be of no moment whether the IRS  
10 employee was correct or not in his interpretation of the law at the  
11 administrative stage. The court's determination of plaintiff's correct  
12 tax liability will be made by examining the deduction in question in  
light of the underlying facts and the applicable law. Given these  
circumstances, the court concludes that the portion of the supporting  
statement comprising the IRS employee's legal analysis is not  
relevant to any of the issues herein and is thus outside the scope of  
discovery.

13 *Xcel Energy*, 237 F.R.D. at 419, quoting *Mayes*, 1986 WL 10093 at \*2-3.

14 The plaintiff in *Xcel Energy* argued, however, that the internal memoranda of the IRS  
15 agents were relevant because the Internal Revenue Code provides an exception to the imposition of  
16 penalties if there is "substantial authority" for the taxpayer's position. *Id.*, 237 F.R.D. at 419, citing  
17 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(I) and Treasury Regulation §1.6620-4(d)(2). In rejecting the argument  
18 that the memoranda were relevant on this basis, the court stated that it had "found no authority for  
19 the proposition that the internal ruminations of IRS agents, during an administrative consideration  
20 of the taxpayer's tax liability, could serve, however slightly, as the "substantial authority" required  
21 by Section 6662(d)(2)(B)(I), and Xcel has drawn none to our attention." *Id.*

22 There are, however, contexts in which such information may be relevant and discoverable.  
23 In *United States v. Cathcart*, 2009 WL 482220, \*3-4 (N.D.Cal. 2009), the government sought the  
24 imposition of a penalty against the defendant based on the allegation that he participated in a "90%  
25 stock loan program" which constituted an abusive tax shelter or tax fraud scheme. The government  
26 was required to prove that defendant knew or should have known that the program was fraudulent.  
27 The defendant sought to discover whether the IRS had concluded, in prior audits of other taxpayers,  
28 that the same loan program was not an abusive tax shelter. In holding that defendant was entitled

1 to some discovery on this issue, the court stated: “If the IRS concluded that the program was  
2 legitimate when it audited borrowers, that may tend to show that a reasonable person in defendant’s  
3 position would believe that the program was not an abusive tax shelter.” *Id.* at \*5.

4 As a general rule, a taxpayer’s reliance on an erroneous IRS administrative ruling is no  
5 defense to the payment of a lawful tax. *See Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States*, 51 Fed.Cl. 1, 6-  
6 7 (2001), citing *Dixon v. United States*, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73, 85 S.Ct. 1301 (1965). The “safe  
7 haven” provision of §530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, however, provides an exception to this rule  
8 as it relates to the employment status of individuals for whom employment taxes may be owed.

9 Section 530(a)(1) states as follows:

10 If –

11 (A) for purposes of employment taxes, the taxpayer did not  
treat an individual as an employee for any period, and

12 (B) in the case of periods after December 31, 1978, all  
13 Federal tax returns (including information returns) required to  
be filed by the taxpayer with respect to such individual for  
14 such period are filed on a basis consistent with the taxpayer’s  
treatment of such individual as not being an employee,

15 then, for purposes of applying such taxes for such period with respect  
to the taxpayer, the individual shall be deemed not to be an employee  
16 unless the taxpayer had no reasonable basis for not treating such  
individual as an employee.  
17

18 Section 530(a)(2) sets forth statutory standards “providing one method of satisfying the  
19 requirements of paragraph (1).” It states:

20 For purposes of paragraph (1), a taxpayer shall in any case be treated  
as having a reasonable basis for not treating an individual as an  
21 employee for a period if the taxpayer’s treatment of such individual  
for such period was in reasonable reliance on any of the following:

22 (A) judicial precedent, published rulings, technical advice  
23 with respect to the taxpayer, or a letter ruling to the taxpayer;

24 (B) a past Internal Revenue Service audit of the taxpayer in  
which there was no assessment attributable to the treatment  
25 (for employment tax purposes) of the individuals holding  
positions substantially similar to the position held by this  
26 individual; or

27 (C) long-standing recognized practice of a significant segment  
of the industry in which such individual was engaged.  
28



Section 530 “was designed to relieve employers of the burden of surprise or uncertain imposition of retroactive tax liability resulting from an increase in IRS employment-status audits.” *General Investment Corp. v. United States*, 823 F.2d 337, 339 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987).<sup>2</sup> The statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer, although the taxpayer has the burden of establishing that he meets the requirements of §530 by a preponderance of the evidence. *Springfield v. United States*, 88 F.3d 750, 753 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996). In addition to the matters listed in §530(a)(2)(A),(B) and (C), “a taxpayer may demonstrate any other reasonable basis for the treatment of an employee for tax purposes.” *Id.* See also *General Investment Corp.*, 823 F.2d at 340 (“Section 530(a)(2)(C) is but one way for an employer to prove it had a ‘reasonable basis’ for not treating its workers as employees for tax purposes.”).

In support of the relevancy of their discovery requests, Plaintiffs state that “to demonstrate, in part, [their] entitlement to relief under Section 530 [Plaintiffs] will present evidence that there was a recognized industry practice wherein *Centennial’s workers were independent contractors* and the status of Centennial’s workers as independent contractors was *accepted by the IRS* (as well as being an accepted practice in the local drywall industry). [Plaintiffs] appropriately believed [they] did not have to pay taxes for Centennial’s workers since no other subcontractor was.” *Responses to Motion for Protective Order (#35) p 14; (#33), pp. 13-14.*

Subsection 530(a)(2)(C) requires the taxpayer to prove two elements. First, the taxpayer must prove that there was, in fact, a long-standing recognized practice in a significant segment of

---

<sup>2</sup> As stated in *Springfield v. United States*, 88 F.3d 750, 751 n. 2 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996):

Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-86, was originally intended to provide interim relief for taxpayers who were involved in employment tax controversies with the IRS, and it therefore initially applied only to periods prior to January 1, 1980. H.R.Rep. No. 1748, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), *reprinted in* 1978-3 C.B. 629, 632. It was temporarily extended twice and then extended indefinitely by Section 269 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”), Pub.L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 552. Section 530 was never codified, but it is reproduced in the notes following I.R.C. § 3401 [26 U.S.C. § 3401].



1 the industry. Second, the taxpayer must prove that he relied on this practice in the tax treatment of  
2 his or her workers. The court in *General Investment Corp.* held that the plaintiff satisfied its  
3 burden by presenting testimony by its principal officer and another mine operator that mining  
4 companies in the county treated their mine workers as independent contractors. 823 F.2d at 340-41  
5 In *Springfield*, the plaintiff met his burden by presenting undisputed testimony by himself and by  
6 salesmen that independent used car dealers in the county treated their salesmen as independent  
7 contractors. 88 F.3d at 753-54. *See also 303 West 42<sup>nd</sup> St. Enterprises, Inc. v. Internal Revenue*  
8 *Services*, 181 F.3d 272, 277 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1999) (holding that taxpayer's survey of its particular industry  
9 regarding the tax treatment of the same type of worker may be sufficient to establish the practice of  
10 a significant segment of the industry). Statements made by IRS officers or employees to business  
11 operators/taxpayers recognizing the existence of the practice in the industry are also relevant and  
12 may be admissible to prove the existence of the practice. The Government is therefore not entitled  
13 to a protective order in regard to discovery of any such statements.

14 The taxpayer can also establish reasonable reliance based on judicial precedent, published  
15 rulings, technical advice with respect to the taxpayer, a letter ruling to the taxpayer or a past IRS  
16 audit that resulted in a finding or inference that similarly situated workers were not employees for  
17 tax purposes. §530(a)(2)(A) and (B).

18 The IRS apparently did not issue any technical advice memoranda or private letter rulings to  
19 Desert Valley or Denko stating that it was proper for them to treat the drywall workers as  
20 independent contractors. Nor did the IRS conduct any prior audits of Desert Valley or Denko  
21 relating to the tax treatment of such workers. Plaintiffs allege, however, that they relied on  
22 representations made to them by CDSI that the IRS had approved CDSI's treatment of the drywall  
23 workers as independent contractors and that it was proper for the Plaintiffs to also treat such  
24 workers as independent contractors so long as the same conditions relating to control over the  
25 workers were present. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite a September 6, 1989 letter that an  
26 IRS officer sent to the president of CDSI, which stated as follows:

27 Per our discussion relating to the employment tax examination just  
28 completed, as long as the same independent contractor conditions  
exist, there is no employment tax issue.

1 The independent subing to you is:

2 at risk (can lose cash out of pocket on a particular  
3 job), completing work on a per job basis rather than by  
4 the hour, not required by you to perform personally,  
and control of work rests with sub (outside general  
requirements)

5 I would like you to pass on some information to your subs if you  
6 would be so kind. If the so called subs to your subs are not operating  
7 under the same conditions as I mentioned briefly above, those  
workers are employees and your subs are employers subject to  
employment taxes.

8 *Responses to Motion for Protective Order (#35), (#33), Exhibit 1.*

9 Plaintiffs also cited a purported January 4, 2007 letter from an IRS Revenue Office  
10 Examiner.<sup>3</sup> The document concerns an examination as to whether a corporate vice-president of  
11 CDSI, who consulted on real estate development matters, was an independent contractor. Although  
12 the document does not directly concern the employment status of drywall workers, item 10 at the  
13 bottom of the page states:

14 Due to a previous employment tax examination, the taxpayer is  
15 afforded a Section 530 safe harbor for the dry-waller class of  
16 employee. The taxpayer has never been examined for independent  
real estate development class of worker.

17 Plaintiffs argue that this document confirms that as recently as the end of 2006, the IRS  
18 recognized CDSI's right, pursuant to §530, to treat the drywall workers as independent contractors.

19 Section 530(a)(2) does not provide any express authority for a taxpayer to rely on IRS  
20 technical memoranda or private letter rulings issued to other taxpayers. In this case, however, the  
21 Plaintiffs contracted with CDSI to provide drywall workers for their construction projects and  
22 allegedly relied on its representations that the IRS had approved or confirmed the independent  
23 contractor status of the workers. The Court could therefore find, pursuant to §530, that it was  
24 reasonable for Plaintiffs to rely on CDSI's representations so long as CDSI had a reasonable basis  
25 for making such representations. Technical advice memoranda or private letter rulings issued to  
26

---

27 <sup>3</sup> Nothing on the face of the document confirms that it was a letter from an IRS officer. The  
28 Government, however, has not disputed Plaintiffs' representation regarding the exhibit.

1 CDSI which approved or confirmed the independent contractor status of the workers would provide  
2 evidence supporting the reasonableness of CDSI's belief and representations. Likewise, prior IRS  
3 audits of CDSI which resulted in no assessments being made based on a finding that the workers  
4 were employees could also support the reasonableness of CDSI's belief and representations.  
5 Discovery regarding such matters is therefore relevant. On the other hand, the internal memoranda  
6 of IRS agents containing their analysis regarding the employment status of the drywall workers is  
7 irrelevant so long as the memoranda and/or their contents were not disclosed to CDSI or Plaintiffs.  
8 If the memoranda discuss communications between the IRS and CDSI (or Plaintiffs) regarding the  
9 employment status of the workers, however, information regarding such communications are  
10 relevant and discoverable.

11 The Government also argues that pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103(a) it is prohibited from  
12 disclosing any return or return information concerning a non-party taxpayer, in this case CDSI. As  
13 the Government notes, however, §6103 contains several exceptions, including an exception which  
14 permits disclosure to a person authorized by the taxpayer to receive such information. CDSI is a  
15 defunct corporation. Plaintiffs have attached to their response an authorization by CDSI's former  
16 president, Edwin Braithwaite, authorizing the release of return information to Plaintiffs for  
17 purposes of this lawsuit. The Government appears to accept, or at least does not strenuously  
18 dispute, the validity of this authorization pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103(e)(1)(D). Section  
19 6103(h)(4)(C) also provides that return information may be disclosed in a Federal or State judicial  
20 or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration if such return or return information  
21 directly relates to a transactional relationship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and  
22 the taxpayer, and which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the proceeding. In this case,  
23 return information relating to the employment tax treatment of CDSI's drywall workers appears to  
24 directly relate to the tax treatment of those workers by Plaintiffs arising out of the contractual  
25 relationship between CDSI and Plaintiffs. It therefore also directly relates to the resolution of the  
26 tax issue in this case. Section 6103(a) therefore does not preclude the discovery of relevant return  
27 information relating to the tax treatment of CDSI's drywall workers.


28 ...

**CONCLUSION**

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that discovery into the internal analysis, impressions or conclusions of IRS employees or officers relating to Plaintiffs' or CDSI's potential liability for the employment taxes at issue is irrelevant. The Government is therefore entitled to a protective order against Plaintiffs' efforts to discover such information, whether it be through depositions of IRS personnel, interrogatories or requests for production. Plaintiffs are not precluded, however, from discovering statements made by the IRS to CDSI and/or Plaintiffs regarding the employment status of the drywall workers, regardless of whether such statements were made in the form of technical advice memoranda, private letter rulings or other forms of communication. Plaintiffs are also not precluded from discovering relevant information regarding prior IRS audits of CDSI which resulted in determinations relevant to the drywall workers' status as independent contractors or employees, and upon which CDSI may have relied in allegedly representing to Plaintiffs that the workers were independent contractors. Accordingly,

**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Defendant/Counterclaimant United States' Motion for Protective Order (#34), in Case No. 2:10-cv-490-KJD-GWF and Motion for Protective Order (#32) in Case No. 2:10-cv-498-LRH-GWF are **granted** in accordance with and subject to the limitations set forth in this order.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2011.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
GEORGE FOLEY, JR.  
United States Magistrate Judge